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RECENT CASE
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES - TITLE TO WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS IN LANDS OF UNITED STATES - UNITED STATES HAS
RESERVED RIGHTS TO WATER IN NATIONAL FOREST ONLY FOR-
PURPOSES OF TIMBER AND WATERSHED MANAGEMENT AND NOT FOR
PURPOSES OF WILDLIFE PRESERVATION, RECREATION, AESTHETICS OR
STOCK WATERING.
In 1899 the Gila National Forest was reserved from the public
domain by executive order pursuant to statutory authority' which
was silent on the subject of water rights. 2 This action was brought
for a general adjudication of rights to the water of the Rio
Mimbres. 3 The issue before the Court was what amount of water, if
any, did Congress intend to reserve for use in the national forest.
4
1. The Creative Act of March 3, 1891, provides as follows:
The President of the United States may, from time to time, set apart and reserve in
any State or Territory having public land bearing forests, in any part of the public
lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial
value or not, as national forests, and the President shall, by public proclamation,
declare the establishment of such forests and the limits thereof....
16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970) (repealed Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)).
2. United States v. New Mexico, _ U.S.-, _ ; 98 S. Ct. 3012, 3015 (1978). The Special
Master, to whom the state district court referred portions of this case, found "that the United States
was diverting 6.9 acre-feet per annum of water for domestic-residential use, 6.5 acre-feet for road
water use, 3.23 ,cre-feet for domestic-recreational use, and . 10 acre-feet for 'wildlife' purposes," in
addition to using water for stock watering, and that "an 'instream flow' of six cubic-feet per second
was being 'used' for the purposes of fish preservation." Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 3016. The Special
Master felt that the United States had "reserved" the right to water for these uses by creating the
national forest. Id.
3. Id. at __. 98 S. Ct. at 3013. The Rio Mimbres originates in the Gila National Forest and
provides private downstream users with water for irrigation, mining, and residential purposes. In
1966 the Mimbres Valley Irrigation Company sued to enjoin allegedly illegal appropriations of water
from the river. The State of New Mexico intervened, seeking a general adjudication of water rights
in the Rio Mimbres and the United States wasjoined pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1978), which
provides as follows:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of
or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by
purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to
such suit.
4. _ U.S. at __ , 98 S. Ct. at 3013. The state district court and the New Mexico Supreme
Court ruled that the United States was not entitled to a minimum instream flow for aesthetic,
recreational, and wildlife purposes, and any federal permitee within the national forest wanting an
appropriation for stock watering must comply with procedures established by state law. Mimbres
Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek. 90 N.M. 410, _ . 564 P.2d 615, 617-19 (1977). A minimum
instream flow is considered to be that water which is retained solely for the purpose of preserving the
stream and the ecological system which it supports. Comment, Federal Protection ofInstream Values, 57
NEs. L. REV. 386 (1978). See generally Comment, Minimum Stream Flow: The Legislative Alternative, 57
NEri. L. RE,,. 704 (1978).
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The United States Supreme Court held that under the reserved
waters doctrine' and the Organic Act, 6  Congress impliedly
reserved enough water necessary to provide for favorable water
flows and a continuous supply of timber; however, no water was
reserved for the purposes of wildlife preservation, stock watering,
aesthetics or recreation. 7 United States v. New Mexico, _ J.
S.-, 98 S. Ct. 3012 (1978).
The importanc,; of water in the arid states for social and
economic development has had a profound impact on the evolution
of water law in the West.8 The wisdom and perhaps necessity of
allowing western states to develop their own law of water rights in
accordance with local needs has been consistently recognized in
legislation designed to promote the development of federally owned
5. The reserved waters doctrine, also called the reserved rights doctrine and the implied-
resetrst'i otitoni-o usatc rs (los:trine, provides that where Congress has reserved lands fronm the public
tlotnin for a specified prlose, it has also impliedly reserved the rights to the use of then
unapprolpriated water in suflficnt quantity to effectuate those purposes. Arizona v. California. 373
U.S. 546. 600-01 (1963). The righ to sch it use is given priorily as of the (late of the land reservation
and is roi dcpendatit ilpon ld, itrntediate beneficial usv of the water. Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. i211. 1:39 (1976). Thus, private apprtlpriators wshose rights have become vested under state law
tay find their rights subrdinated to a latcr federal claim if the establishment of the reservation
predates the vesting of their rights. One effect of the application of the reserved waters doctrine is
that state-rreated rights may be impaired in this manner without compensation. Kiechel & Green,
Riparian Rights Revisited: Legal Basis For Federal 1nsrram Flow Rights, i6 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 969 (1976).
No naion;l firest shall be 'stallishcd. cxccpt to improve and protect the forest within
the Iboindaries. or fir tl" purpose ofsecturig favorable conditions of water flows, and
ft Funish a cntititus supliv of timler otr the use and necessities of citizens of the
Unitt .( Slates: ltl it is no Ilic ptrpose or" itltcn of thtse provisions. or of said section.
,mtoitit he t inclusion t hb rein of linds mnte valua lle fot the iineral therein, or fot
atricultral purposes. tihai ftr orest pur pslitfss.
16 U.S.C. § 475 (19701). Prir to lic enactmnt ofthe Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16
U.S.C. § 528 (1974). e, infra note 50 atd accompanying text, the Organic Act was the only
Congressional sttlnient ofintent concerning the purposes of establishing national forests.
7. -U.S. at _. 98 S. Ct. at 3023. Mr. Justice Powell dissenting and joined by Mr. justices
Bretian Marshall. tnt \White. argued tIhat Cngn-ss reserved by implitation water necessary for
tht preservation oftihe fores cco-syst-ti which i'ludes wildlife and fish. Id.
8. California v. Unittd States. -U.S. _. 98 S. Ct. 2985, 2990 (1978). Throughout the
western states the coi i o lass dittrine of riparian righlis s 'as rapidly replaced by the lays- of prior
appropriation, 'hich was better suit( ( o allocating tlIt- starce resource to meet the needs of
econotmic development. Id. The riparian riglts doctrine conferred upon a riparian owner the right to
the continous natural flow of the str-am or rivter. tnforcable against upstream users. In contrast,
appropriation of' water and its application to a bn-ficial use purstant to the law of prior
appropriation 'ill establish a priority over stbseqtent appropriators. upstream or downstrean. for a
quantiiy r-asonablv required for the benelicial ise. Arizona s. California. 298 U.S. 558, 565-66
(1936). In United States '. Rio Grande Darn & Irrigation Co.. 174 U.S. 690 (1898). the Court noted
the following:
[Ajlthough there has been in all the Western States an adoption or recognition of the
common law. it 'as tarlv developed in their history that the mining industry in certain
States, the reclamation of arid lands in others. compelled a departure froni the
common law rule, and justified an appropriation of flovsing ws'aters both for mining
purposes and for the reclamation ofarid lands, and there has come to be recognized in
those States, by custom and by state legislation, a diffe-rent rule - a rule ss'hich
permits, under certain circumstances, the appropriation of the water of a flowing
stream for other than domestic purposes.
Id. at 704. See 3 THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMMISSION. WATER
RESOURCEs LAW, 34-35 (1950) [hereinafter cited as 3 REPORT].
RECENT CASE 477
lands. 9 Thus, the state doctrine of prior appropriation' ° was
recognized and given approval in the Mining Act of 1866,1" the
Desert Land Act of 1877,12 and the Reclamation Act of 1902.13
9. -U.S. at __ , 98 S. Ct. at 3015. See California v. United States, __ U.S. __ , 98 S.
Ct. 2985 (1978). "The history of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States in
the reclamation of arid lands of the western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the
consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress." Id. at 2990.
10. Pursuant to New Mexico statutory provisions the requirements for rights to attach by prior
appropriation include application to the state for a permit, followed by the application of a specified
amount of diverted water to a recognized beneficial use. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-1 to 72-5-6
(1978). Once the right has vested, it is enforceable against all junior holders. See Comment, New
Mexico's National Forests and the Implied Reservation Docty'ine, 16 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 975, 976 (1976). See
also 3 REPORT, supra note 8 at 154-58.
Among the western states which have adopted the law of prior appropriation in whole or in
part are Arizona, Brasher v. Gibson, 2 Ariz. App. 91, 406 P.2d 441 (1965); California, Pasedena v.
Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950); Colorado, Whitten
v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963); Idaho, Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310
(1969); Montana, Richland County v. Anderson, 129 Mont. 559, 291 P.2d 267 (1955); Nebraska,
Brummond v. Vogel, 184 Neb. 415, 168 N.W.2d 24 (1969); Nevada, Walsh v. Wallace, 26 Nev.
299, 67 P. 914 (1902); New Mexico, Martinez v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134 (1952); Oregon,
Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959); Texas, State v..Hidalgo County Water
Control & Improv. Dist., 443 S.W.2d 728, (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); and Utah, Stubbs v. Ercanbrack,
13 Utah2d 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962).
I1.
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the
same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions
of courts, the possessers and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
protected in the same, and the right of way for the construction of ditches and canals
for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and confirmed....
Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §661 (1964)).
In 1870 the following amendment was added: "All patents granted, or preemption or
homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and
reservoirs used in connection with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized
by this section." Act of'July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1965) ). In United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690(1868). the Court construed this act to be
"a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its
continued use," rather than as a grant of water rights under federal law. Id. at 705.
12.
It shall be lawful for any citizen of the United States, . . . upon payment of twenty-five
cents per acre - to file a declaration . . . that he intends to reclaim a tract of desert
land not exceeding one section, by conducting water upon same, within the period of
three years thereafter: Provided however That the right to the use of water by the person
so conducting the same, on or to any tract of desert land of six hundred and forty acres
shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation: and such right shall not exceed the
amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of
irrigation and reclamation: and all surplus water over and above such actual
appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources
of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free
for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing
purposes subject to existing rights.
Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1965)).
Legislative history indicates clearly that this section was intended to ratify and confirm the
regulation of water rights in accordance with state prior appropriation law. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3227 (1866). In addition, the Court has ruled that this section effected "a severance
of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself." California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935). In Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907), the Court held that a state could not be compelled to adhere to
either the riparian rights doctrine or the law ofprior appropriation, and in Rio GrandeDam [Irrtation
Co. the Court stated that, "[a]s to every stream within its dominion a State may change . . . [the]
common law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such purposes as it deems
wise." 174 U.S. at 702-03.
13.
[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or to in any
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The emergence of the controversial reserved waters doctrine
4
has had an unsettling effect on private appropriators and
bureaucrats in the western states.' 5 The weighty consequences of
the doctrine's development and application are clear-in light of the
extent of the federally owned lands,' 6 and the fact that more than
sixty percent of the average annual water yield in the eleven
western states derives from federal reservations.' 7 In North Dakota
the federal government owns more than 2.3 million acres which
comprises approximately five percent of the surface acreage in the
state.' 8 As the New Mexico Court noted, the application of the
reserved waters doctrine will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon
reduction in water already diverted to beneficial use. 19
The reserved waters doctrine was first enunciated in Winters v.
United States.20 In Winters, settlers upstream of Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in Montana appropriated water from the Milk River
in compliance with state law and without notice of federal, reserved
water claims. 2' The Court pointed out that such action prevented
the Indians from irrigating otherwise tillable acres. The Court held
that the United States could not have intended to confine the tribes
on a reservation suitable only for agriculture and then deny them
way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control,
pl'qt riation use. or distribution of water used in irrigation. or any vested right
a('fuircd ithreunder. and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions
ofthis Act, shall proceed in conformity' with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any
way affeIct any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner,
appropriator, or user of' water in, to, or from an, interstate stream or the waters
lcreo': Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of
this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis,
the measure, and the limit of the right.
Reclamnation Act of.June 17. 1902, Section 8, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 383
(1964)).
This section has been interpreted in California v. United States. -_U.S. _. 98 S. Ct. 2985
(1978), to inan that in the absence of additional expression ofCongressional intent. the Secretary of
the Interior is not to proceed with any project where there is a divergence between state and federal
law. and that in the absence of such expression, a state may legitimately impose conditions on
irrigation permits issued to the federal government. Id. at _ 98 S. Ct. at 3001 (1978).
14. S esupra note 5.
15. Trefease, Water Resources on the Public Lands PLLRC's Solution to the Reservation Doctrine, 6 LAND
& WArER L. R.v. 89 (1970). Trelease points out that retognizing rights to water when there has
been no use of that right and thus no notice of a claim either to state officials or to other appropriators
threawns tn I) disrupt the established water rights priority system: 2) destroy, without
compensation, water rights considered to have vested under state law: and, 3) impede water resource
development pltnning by state agencies. Id. at 90.
16. The federal government owns approximately 43% of the land in Arizona, 45% in
California. 36% in Colorado, 63% in Idaho, 29% in Montana, 86% in Nevada, 34% in New
Mexico, 52% in Oregon, 6% in South Dakota, 64% in Utah, 30% in Washington, and 48% in
Wyoming. These percentages were compiled from figures found in GENERAL SERVICES
AI)tINISTRATION, INVENTORY REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY OWsNED BY THE UNITED STATES
THRttt:ttOIT THE WoRt.D AS OF.JNE 30. 1974, AT 57-58 [hereinafter cited as G.S.A. INVENTORY],
antl 't-. WoRi.i) BooK ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOlS. 1. 3, 4. 10. 13, 14. 18, 19.20 & 21 (1974).
17. U.S. ati_+ 98 S. Ct. at 3013-14 n.3.
18. G.S.A. INVENTORY, supra note 16, at 58.
19. _ U.S. at . 98 S. Ct. at 3016.
20. 207 U.S. 56,4 (!1(18).
21. *'tinters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1908).
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the water necessary to irrigate and cultivate the land.22 The Court
relied on language from United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Co., to support the conclusion that the United States had the power
to exempt waters from appropriation under state law. 23 In so
holding, 24 the Court rejected the argument that a reservation of
water for future use on federal land is revoked by a subsequent
admission of the state into the union.
2 5
The reserved waters doctrine was expanded in Arizona v.
California. 26 It was held that admission of a state into the union does
not extinguish Congress' right to subsequently reserve
unappropriated water which is appurtenant to federally-owned
lands within the state. 27 More importantly, the Court ruled that the
doctrine applied to all federal enclaves, including national parks
and forests. 28 The Arizona Court also concluded that the right to the
use of then unappropriated water in sufficient quantities to meet
present and future needs vested as of the date of the land
reservation, with no requirement of immediate appropriation for
beneficial use. 
29
The scope of the reserved waters doctrine was further refined
22. Id. at 576-77.
23. 207 U.S. at 577. In. Rio Grande Dam &IrriationCo., the Court noted the following:
Jln the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by its legislation
destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to
the continued flow of its waters: so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial
use of the governmental property.
174 U. S. at 703.
24. The decision of the Winters Court was also based in part on the rule that all ambiguities
in agreements and treaties with Indian Nations and Tribes are to be resolved in favor of the Indians.
207 U. S. at 576. Following the essential logic of the Winters case, the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
ruled that the intent of Congress to reserve water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the land
reservation can be evidenced by statute or executive order, and need not be based on a treaty or other
expressed covenant. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
This interpretation has been ratified by the Supreme Court. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U. S.
128 (1976): Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963).
25. 207 U.S. at 577-78. The argument seems to be that the United States conferred upon
Montana by admitting it into the Union "on an equal footing with the original states" all of the
so ereign rights over real property which the United States previously enjoyed, and thereafter had
sitiply a proprietary interest in federally owned land. subject to state law. In rejecting this argument,
the Winters Court seems to have impliedly relied on the supremacy clause as the basis for the
doctrine. Ser generally Corker. Let There Be No Nagging Doubts. Nor Shall Private Property, Including Water
Rights, Be Taken For Public Use Without Just Compensation, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 109 (1970):
Comment. New Nfexico's National Forests and the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 16 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 975
(1976).
26. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The adjudication of water rights to the Colorado River involved
fi.deral claims on behalf of five Indian Reservations in addition to claims to the use of water in Lake
Mead National Recreation Area, Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, The Imperial National
Wildlife Refuge. and the Gila National Forest. Id. at 600.
27. Id. at 597-98. The Court found authority in the commerce clause and the property clause of
the United States Constitution. Id.
28. Id. at 601.
29. Id
30. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The United States sought to enjoin private pumping of ground waters
which lowered the pool level in Devil's Hole. Death Valley National Monument and threatened the
existence of a rare species of desert pupfish. The area has been reserved for its historical, educational
and scientific value by presidential proclamation pursuant to the American Antiquities Preservation
Act. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). prior to the water appropriations by the Cappaerts. 426 U.S. at 131-37.
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in Cappaert v. United States. 30 In Cappaert, the United States sought to
enjoin groundwater pumping by a private appropriator whose own
water rights were perfected pursuant to the Desert Land Act. 3' In
enforcing the claimed federal reserve rights, the Court refused to
interpret the Desert Land Act as applying to federal lands which
are reserved from the public domain for specified purposes, and
concluded that federal, reserved water rights are governed by
federal law. 3" The Court also emphasized that in reserving water
rights by implication, Congress reserved only enough water to meet
the purposes of the reservation of land and no more.
33
In order to determine what water rights were reserved, the
Court in New Mexico had to determine the purposes of the
reservation of Gila National Forest. 34 At the time of its withdrawal
from the public domain, the purposes for which a national forest
could be established were enumerated in an ambiguous statute.
35
The dissent argued that this statute provided three purposes for
national forests, as follows: 1) to improve and protect the forest; 2)
to secure favorable conditions of water flows; and, 3) to furnish a
continuous supply of timber.3 6 Hence, appropriating water to
maintain wildlife and fish populations would be permissible in
furtherance of the legitimate purpose of improving and protecting
the forest. 37 The majority rejected this argument, concluding that
watershed and timber management constituted "improving and
protecting the forest" and hence there were actually only two
purposes for the establishment of the forest.
38
In support of its conclusion, the New Mexico Court utilized the
legislative history of the Creative Act,
3 9 and the Organic Act. 40
Congress originally empowered the president to set aside forested
areas for special regulation in order to halt the ravaging of the
31.43 U.S.C. Ch. 9 (1'965). See supra note 12.
32. 426 U.S. at 139-41.
33. Id. at 143. Thus, while the United States was entitled to a water level in the Devil's Hole
pool sufficient to permit survival of the pupfish, the petitioners were allowed to reduce the natural
level of the pool to the court-ordered minimum necessary to insure that survival.
34.. -U.S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 3013.
35. 16 U.S.C. * 475 (1970). The statute provides that "[N]o national forest shall be
established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of
securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use
and necessities of citizens of the United States."
36. -. U.S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 3024 (PowellJ., dissenting). The New Mexico Supreme Court
concurred in this interpretation, but found the facts unable to support a claim. Mimbres Valley
Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977). But see Avondale Irrigation Dist. v.
Northern Idaho Prop., 99 Idaho 30, 577 P.2d 9 (1978).
37. -. U.S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 3023-26 (PowellJ. dissenting).
38. -_ U.S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 3017-18 n.14. According to the majority, a correct rephrasing of
Section 475 would be "to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries," or in other words, for
the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber. Id. (emphasis original).
39. 16U.S.C. § 471 (1970). Seesupra note 1.
40. 16 U.S.C. §475 (1970). Seesupra note 6.
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forests. 4 1 Congress' goals were to provide for proper timber and
watershed management in order to maximize the benefits of the
timber while minimizing the seasonal flooding and providing water
flows conducive to irrigation.
42
Based on this legislative record, the New Mexico Court found it
unlikely that Congress, which intended to limit the President's
power, 43 would grant him the broad mandate to reserve public
lands for "improvement" and "protection.'' 44 Moreover, the
Court argued, if Congress intended to protect wildlife and fish
populations by creating national forests, enactment in 1934 of a
statute 45 providing for game and fish sanctuaries would have been
redundant. 46 The Court cited portions of the National Park Service
Act, 47 and the Superior National Forest Act4 8 as examples of
41. - U.S. at -, 98S. Ct. at 3017.
42. Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 3017-19. The author of the Creative and Organic Act stated as follows:
I believe that the floods that have been raging for the last two months in nearly all of
our rivers from the Red River of the North to the great father of waters in the South,
carrying death and destruction in their flow, is in the large measure due to the reckless
destruction of our mountain forests. . . . I believe that with a rational forestry system,
a sufficient number of carefully selected reservoirs, and a completion of our present
levee system that we will protect the lowlands of the South from overflow, irrigate the
desert lands of.the West, and give the people of the North a continuous supply of
timber
30 CONe, REC. 966 (1897) (remarks ofCong. McRae).
43. Enactment of the Organic Act resulted from Congress' dissatisfaction with President
Cleveland's unrestrained use of the powers granted him under the Creative Act. - U.S. at -, 98 S.
Ct. at 3017. The Congressional Record evidences the outrage of the representatives of the western
states at what they considered the tyrannical and indiscriminate withdrawal of land from productive
use. 30 CoNG. REC. 985 (1877) (remarks of Rep. Bell).
44. -.U.S. at , 98 S. Ct. at 3017 n.14 Establishing forests for their "improvement" and
"protection," independent of any watershed and timber value, was inconsistent with the economic
interests of the West and was considered by the Court to be the evil at which the Organic Act was
aimed. Id. The Court agreed with the statement of the author of the Organic Act, that national
forests "are not parks. . .but have been established for economic reasons." Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at
3018.
45.
For the purpose of providing breeding places for game birds, game animals, and fish
on lands and waters in the national forests not chiefly suitable for agriculture, the
President of the United States is authorized, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
the Interior and Secretary of Commerce and with the approval of the State Legislature
of the respective states in which said national forests are situated, to establish by public
proclamation certain specified and limited areas within said forests as fish and game
sanctuaries or refuges which shall be devoted to the increase of game birds, game
animals, and fish ofall kinds naturally adapted thereto....
16 U.S.C. § 694 (1974).
This section provides for preservation of fish and wildlife in designated areas within the
national forest system. The dissent felt that preservation of wildlife was already contemplated by the
Organic Act. - U.S. at _. 98 S. Ct. at 3024-25 (PowellJ., dissenting).
46. -U.S. at_. 98 S. Ct. at 3019.
47.
ITJhe fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, which
purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historical objects and the
wildlife therein and to provlje for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave th;m unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
16 U.S.C.§ 1 (1970).
48.
In order to preserve the shore lines, rapids, waterfalls, beaches, and other natural
features of the region in an unmodified state of nature, no futher alteration of the
natural water level ofany lake or stream within or bordering upon the designated area
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Congress' ability to express reservations of water rights for explicit
environmental and aesthetic goals when that is their actual
purpose.
49
The Court rejected the Government's suggestion that passage
of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960,50 which provides
that "the national forests are established and shall be administered
for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and
fish purposes," confirmed the view that Congress always intended
a wide range of purposes for the national forests. 5' Stating that the
purpose of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act was to "broaden
the benefits accruing from all reserved forests," '52  the Court
concluded that by enacting this statute, no reservations of waters
were thereby expanded.
53
The most significant portion of the New Mexico decision is the
construction of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act in
conjunction with the Organic Act.54 The Court concluded that
timber management and watershed protection are the primary
purposes of the national forest, but range, recreation, wildlife and
fish purposes are secondary. 55 Thus, while appurtenant water is
irnpliedly reserved for the primary purposes of the land reservation,
water necessary to accomplish secondary purposes must be
acquired pursuant to state water law.
56
As in this case, 57 when environmental principles come into
conflict with the economic interests of mining and agriculture, the
application of the federal reserved waters doctrine is of critical
importance. 58 The Supreme Court in New Mexico ruled that water
shall he aitthorizcd l i t a- permtit license. lase, or other atithorization....
16 U.S.C. §5771) (1970).
49. - U.S. at .98 S. Ci. at 3019.
50.
The purposes of sectiions 528 to 5:31 ol'this title ire declared 1t he stppletmental to. but
not in derogation of. (he purposes for whic the national fij1"sts were established as set
lorth in section 475 of this title.
16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
51. U.S. at _ 98 S. Ct. at 3021 n.21.
52. Id. at_. 98 S. Ct. at 3021.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at __ . 98 S. Ct. ;1t 3021-22. The Court took the language "supplemental to. but not in
dterogation oF' of 16 U .S.C. + 528 (1970) to rec onfirn ilte cotclusion that national forests have two
primary purpstses, rather than atlopting the \,its . that he additonatl irposes stated in Section 528
were intended to be of equal priority withlti two purposes read into the Organic Act __ U.S. at
_ 98 S. Ct. at :302 1.
56. Id.
57. The Court did not dtcide the question of what reserved water rights might exist for the
administration of national forests which were reserved after the passage of the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act. Also. the dissent suggested the Court's view of the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act as not reserving additional waters on existing national forests was dicta because the
question was not briefed or presented to the Court for resolution. - U.S. at . 98 S. Ct. at 3023 n.1
(Powell... dissenting).
58. Id. at -, 98 S. Ct. at 3016. The Court noted that "federal reserved water rights will
RECENT CASE
was reserved in Gila National Forest only to preserve timber and.
maximize water flows for the beneficial appropriation by users
under state law. 5 9 In the future, when the Forest Service wants to
use water in a national forest for purposes other than watershed and





frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy
state and private appropriators. This reality has not escaped the attention ofCongress.. Id.
59. Id. at __ , 98 S. Ct. at 3023.
60. Kiechel and Green obviously tailed to anticipate such a holding by the Court when they
wrote the following in 1976:
[H]ere, as in so many other areas, the law has the good sense to follow nature. just as
in nature a forest inevitably brings with it a network of rivulets, streams, and rivers,
and an associated community of fish, birds, aninals and insects, so does the law
assume, and establish, that the national government, in creating forest reservations,
necessarily also protects and preserves the forest streams which engender and nourish
the flora and fauna insepalrably linked with the forests we walked through in our
youth, or in our dreams.
Kiechel & Green. Riparian Rights Revisited: Legal Basis for Federal Instream Flow Rights, 16 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 969, 974 (1976) (emphasis original).
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